We study the impact of social networks on agents' ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational backgrounds of sell side equity analysts and senior officers of firms, we test the hypothesis that analysts' school ties to senior officers impart comparative information advantages in the production of analyst research. We find evidence that analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations with school ties and going short buy recommendations without ties earns returns of 5.40% per year. We test whether Regulation FD, targeted at impeding selective disclosure, constrained the use of direct access to senior management. We find a large effect: pre-Reg FD the return premium from school ties was 8.16% per year, while post-Reg FD the return premium is nearly zero and insignificant. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the UK), the analyst school-tie premium has remained large and significant over the entire sample period.
identical educational institutions, to identify firms where analysts are more likely to gain direct access to senior management. An advantageous aspect of our network ties is that they are formed far before the information likely being transferred across them, and that the underlying tie (ex. alumni link) is not directly related to the type of information likely being transmitted years later (ex. company related information).
Our main goal is to test the hypothesis that analysts gain comparative information advantages through their social networks; specifically, through educational ties with senior officers and board members of firms that they cover.
We test this hypothesis by building portfolios that replicate sell-side analysts' recommendations and by comparing how analysts perform on firms to which they have ties, relative to firms to which they do not. We test this hypothesis for the universe of sell-side analysts and publicly traded domestic firms for which we are able to collect data on the educational background of both the analyst and senior officers of the firm she covers.
To better understand our approach, consider the following example. In 1992, two sell-side analysts covered XYZ Corp.
1 One analyst, Mr. Smith, shares a connection with the firm, defined as having attended the same academic institution as a member of the board of directors or a senior officer. Among the other stocks he covers, Mr. Smith is also linked to CFM Corp., another large cap stock in the same industry. The second analyst, Mr. Jones, shares no educational link to either firm. As of December 1992, both analysts and the IBES consensus (median) rate the stock as a "HOLD". The results in this example represent a much more systematic pattern across the universe of sell-side equity analysts. Consistent with the hypothesis that educational ties facilitate the transmission of private information, we find that analysts produce significantly better recommendations on firms to which they have an educational tie, relative to firms to which they do not.
Analysts' buy recommendations on school-tied stocks outperform buy recommendations on non-tied stocks by an average of 45 basis points per month (t=3.87), using 12-month calendar time portfolios following the recommendations.
Therefore, a calendar time portfolio strategy exploiting only this school-tie informational advantage on buys, translates into roughly 5.40% outperformance per year. The return differential is largely unaffected after controlling for other determinants of returns such as size, book-to-market, and momentum.
Importantly, since our approach exploits variation within an analyst's portfolio (i.e., performance on tied versus non-tied stocks), our results are not simply an artifact of a selected sample of "smart" or skilled analysts.
We do not find a similar return differential on the analysts' sell recommendations. Analysts' school-tied sells perform roughly the same as their non-tied sell recommendation stocks following the recommendations. One explanation consistent with this finding is that managers are willing to reveal positive (but not negative) information about their firms. Alternatively, this would be consistent with analysts obtaining both good and bad news from their schooltied firms, but perhaps as part of a tacit agreement, acting only on the positive news.
There could be a number of mechanisms that allow information to be transferred along the networks. It may be that alumni networks allow analysts cheaper access to firm-level material information, which then allows them to form superior recommendations. For example, the analyst may have access to explicitly private conference calls with firm officials, or the network may simply reduce the cost to the analyst of obtaining or analyzing information about the firm (ex. the analyst can obtain information about upcoming earnings with fewer calls to the firm). Alternatively, the education network may simply allow analysts to better assess managerial quality. Under this mechanism, there is not a constant flow of information in the network from the firm to the analyst, but instead some inherent information within the network about managerial quality (ex. all members of the Dartmouth network know that the Dartmouth CEO of firm ABC is quite good, while the Dartmouth CEO of XYZ is not).
In order to distinguish between these two alternatives, we exploit a regulation introduced during our sample period explicitly aimed at blocking the former mechanism of selective information transfer: Regulation FD, instated by the SEC in October of 2000. The regulation quite openly gave as its aim the ending of selective disclosure by firms to a subset of market participants. For instance, in the SEC release regarding Regulation FD, the aim was given to stop the occurrence that: "a privileged few gain an informational edge --and the ability to use that edge to profit --from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or diligence." The SEC went on to caution that it was these selective disclosure relationships that allowed agents to: "exploit `unerodable informational advantages´ derived not from hard work or insights, but from their access to corporate insiders. 3 " Our educational social networks may represent exactly this type of `unerodable informational advantage´ that the SEC targeted with Regulation FD. Specifically, if the channel that allows analysts to produce superior recommendations on school-tied stocks is selective disclosure, we may expect this superior ability to be attenuated post-Regulation FD. However, if the education network simply measures analysts' increased ability to assess managerial quality for CEOs they attended school with, it is not clear this would be affected at all by Regulation FD.
We test this hypothesis by splitting our sample to observe analysts' ability on school-tied stocks pre-and post-Regulation FD. All of our evidence points to selective disclosure being the main mechanism of information transfer along the network. All of our effects are positive, large, and significant pre-Regulation FD, and small and insignificant post-Regulation FD. The monthly returns of the longshort calendar time portfolio on the differences between school-tied and non-school- results from the calendar-time portfolios, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is strongly negative, while the combined effect (interaction term+connected) is small (10bp) and insignificant (F-statistic of 1.18), indicating that the school-tie premium is largely absent in the post-Reg FD period. In a separate set of regressions, we also show that the number of school ties an analyst possesses with her covered stocks strongly increases the likelihood of becoming an "All-Star" analyst (a 2 standard deviation increase in connections more than doubles the probability from 9.2% to 20.1%), but only in the pre-Reg FD period;
this result further highlights the value of social networks in precisely those times when selective disclosure is least inhibited.
We construct an out-of-sample test of the impact of Reg FD by replicating our results in the United Kingdom, where there was no such law enacted at this time. 4 Over the entire sample period, we again find a large school-tie return premium on buy recommendations for UK-listed stocks: a long-short portfolio that purchases linked buy recommendations and shorts non-linked buy recommendations earns 187 basis points per month (t=2.79) in raw returns, and 167 basis points per month (t=2.20) in abnormal returns. However, unlike in the US, we see no significant difference in this premium between the pre-and post-Reg FD time periods.
4 Regulations prohibiting the selective disclosure of material information by UK-listed firms have been a part of UK law for decades since rules on insider dealing came into force in the 1980s. Conversations with practitioners in the UK indicate that although clarifications and enhancements to these norms were put into effect in 2001 (through the Financial Services and Markets Act) and 2005 (via the Market Abuse Directive), these acts were generally not viewed as structural shifts in the disclosure environment in the same way that Regulation FD in the US was designed to be.
Lastly we perform a number of robustness checks. We find that the schooltie outperformance is present in both large and small cap stocks, and for stocks with both high and low analyst coverage. In addition, the effect is present in both Ivy league and non-Ivy league connections between analyst and firm, and is nearly unaffected by controlling for school-level returns at the stock level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I of the paper provides a brief background and literature review, while Section II describes the data on both firms and analysts. Section III provides the main results on analyst ability and sell-side school ties. Section IV explores the mechanism for information transfer across the network, while Section V examines alternative hypotheses.
Section VI concludes.
I. Background and literature review
The opinions of sell-side equity analysts are among the most widely solicited, anticipated, and dissected news items in the stock market each day.
Further, since analyst data is available in large quantities and in relatively standardized formats, the sell-side analyst industry offers an ideal testing ground for a number of theories of economic behavior. In this paper we use this testing ground to investigate the idea that agents' educational ties facilitate the transmission of private information into security markets.
A large literature on analyst performance supports the idea that analysts bring valuable information to the market, and have incentives to do so. Numerous studies document the potential profitability of trading on analyst recommendations (see, for example, Womack (1996) , Barber et al. (2001 Barber et al. ( , 2003 , Jegadeesh et al. (2004) ) and earnings forecast revisions (see Stickel (1991) (2006) and Fisman et al. (2006) , among others), and have shown to be important mechanisms for the sharing of information and the adoption of common practices across firms. 9 Our approach is different in that we focus on direct links between board members and equity analysts via shared educational backgrounds.
II. Data
The data in this study is collected from several sources. We search public filings and other miscellaneous information available over the World Wide Web to construct a novel database of educational backgrounds of sell-side analysts issuing recommendations on US domestic stocks.
We start by identifying all sell-side analysts on the I/B/E/S tape who provide at least one recommendation on a domestic stock between 1993 and 2006.
For each analyst, I/B/E/S provides a numeric identifier, the analyst's last name, 8 See also Malloy (2005) , who shows that geographically proximate analysts produce more accurate forecasts, but do so both before and after the enactment of Regulation FD; as well as Groysberg, Healy, Chapman, Shanthikumar, and Gui (2007) , who document a decline in the forecast accuracy advantage of sell-side analysts over buy-side analysts after the enactment of Regulation FD. 9 Examples of the latter include the adoption of poison pills (Davis (1991)), corporate acquisition activity (Haunschild (1993) ), CEO compensation (Khurana (2002)), and the decision to make political contributions (Mizruchi (1992) year, which comprise 23% of the universe of sell-side analysts and 23% of the total number of recommendations per year.
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Our sample of firms averages 1,705 per year, which comprise 74% of total market value of CRSP stocks covered by sellside analysts.
In Panel B we report summary statistics by firm-year or analyst-year. The typical analyst in our sample covers 14 stocks while the mean coverage per firm is around 5 analysts. The average size percentile is 0.78 while the average book-tomarket percentile in 0.37, reflecting the known fact that analyst coverage tends to 12 See also Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) for additional details on data construction and matching using the BoardEx data. 13 Note that in unreported tests we have verified that the characteristics of our sample are very similar to those of the entire database of I/B/E/S recommendations over this time period (e.g., in terms of the proportion of buys/sells; average calendar-time portfolio returns of all buy recommendations, etc.). Also, as noted earlier, since our approach exploits variation within an analyst's portfolio (i.e., performance on tied versus non-tied stocks), our findings are not simply an artifact of a selected sample of "smart" or skilled analysts.
be skewed towards larger cap growth stocks. In this section we examine the stock return performance of recommendations by sell-side analysts on securities to which they have school ties. We formally test the hypothesis that recommendations issued on stocks with school ties outperform recommendations issued on stocks without ties.
To assess the relative performance of sell-side recommendations we use a standard calendar time portfolio approach. 15 We classify a stock as having educational ties to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (defined as either the CEO, CFO, or Chairman of board) or a board member.
We use the I/B/E/S numeric recommendation code to assign each recommendation to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded relative to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy or strong buy rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded relative to the previous recommendation, initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold, sell or strong sell rating, or dropped from coverage by the analyst. We also consider a version of both portfolios using only upgrades or downgrades. If the brokerage house does not report a stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve months, we let it expire.
Our portfolios are constructed as follows. For the BUY portfolio, we begin by identifying each BUY recommendation as described above. For each buy recommendation, we skip a trading day between the recommendation date t and investment, and purchase the recommended stock at the close of day t+1. By waiting a trading day we exclude the recommendation-date returns and ensure that the portfolios are based on available information. 16 Each recommended stock remains in the portfolio until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the underlying recommendation expires. Again, we skip a day between an event that causes a stock to be unloaded and the actual disinvestment: e.g. if a stock is downgraded at date t, we unwind the position at the close of date t+1. If more than one analyst recommends a particular stock on a given date, then the stock will appear multiple times in the portfolio, once for each recommendation.
Finally, we compute value weighted calendar time portfolios by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the analyst's recommendation code. For the BUY portfolio, we reverse-score the recommendation codes so that a Strong Buy is set equal to 5 (instead of 1, as it is in the raw data) and a Strong Sell is set equal to 1, so that a higher weight indicates a relatively more bullish recommendation. We use the exact same method for the SELL portfolio, with the exception that in the final step we use the actual recommendation codes as portfolio weights; i.e., a Strong Buy is set equal to 1 and a Strong Sell is set equal to 5, so that a higher weight indicates a relatively more bearish recommendation.
This approach yields a time series of returns for each portfolio and has the advantage of corresponding to a simple investment strategy of following sell-side recommendations, mimicking both the directional advice and the holding period implied by the timing of the revisions.
For each stock, we compute risk-adjusted ("DGTW") returns as in Daniel et al. (1997) by subtracting the return on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-to-book ratio, and one year momentum quintile, from the stock's raw return. We update the 125 characteristic portfolios at the end of June of each year using conditional sorts, and adjust the market-to-book ratios using the 48-industry classifications from Ken French's website.
17 Table III This long/short portfolio has the advantage that it conditions on the signal of the recommendation (BUY in both cases), and so isolates solely the school-tie premium portion of the analysts' recommendations. If we restrict the sample to ties to senior officials only (rather than to senior managers or anyone on the board of directors), the return on this long-short portfolio increases to 55 basis points per month (t=3.75). The risk-adjusted abnormal returns are given in the third and fourth columns of Table III . The buy recommendations on stocks without school ties earn basically a zero abnormal return. In contrast, the buy recommendations on stocks where the analyst has school ties continue to outperform in abnormal returns, resulting in the school-tied premium being largely unaffected by the other return determinants (40 basis points, (t=4.63)).
The last two columns of Panel A report portfolio returns for the subset of upgrades only (i.e., upgrades to buy or strong buy only, excluding initiations and reiterations). The long-short portfolio of tied minus untied upgrades again earns large returns, ranging from 29 to 37 basis points per month over the full sample period.
Panel B of 
IV. Mechanism
Our results on the outperformance of buy recommendations by analysts with school ties suggest a statistically and economically important channel for the transfer of private information. In this section we explore possible hypotheses regarding the manner in which this information might be conveyed, the impact of school ties on analyst status, and the types of information being transferred across these networks.
As noted above, our main test to distinguish between direct information transfer as the driver of our findings versus superior assessments of managerial quality is to split the sample pre-and post-Reg FD. The pre-Reg FD period was allegedly a time period plagued with problems of selective disclosure between firms and equity analysts, and the law put in place was expressly designed to curb these practices. Table IV shows that the large returns to school ties on buy recommendations are concentrated in the pre-Reg FD period (68 basis points per month, or 8.16% (t=4.36) per year, pre-Reg FD for the long-short portfolio return, compared to only 14 basis points (t=0.84) post-Reg FD). The average monthly difference between the long-short portfolio returns in the two periods is large, 55 basis points, and statistically significant (t=2.38). Table V reports results for sell recommendations, splitting the sample in the same way; not surprisingly given our earlier results on sells, we find no significant differences between the two periods for sell recommendations.
The motivation expressed by the SEC in their release 18 on Regulation FD
suggests that the school ties we identify in our tests are exactly the sort of private information channel between firms and analysts that the regulation was designed to address. The fact that our results are significantly weaker in the post-Reg FD period suggests that the regulation was effective in curbing the apparent information advantage that analysts gain through their school networks.
To test this idea more formally, we employ panel regressions of returns on In summary, all of our findings indicate that Regulation FD had a large impact on the school-tie premium that we identify in this paper, suggesting that the most likely mechanism driving the superior performance of analysts on their school-tied recommendations is direct information transfer.
23 21 Replacing raw returns (Column 1) as the dependent variable with abnormal returns (Column 4) results in the constant term becoming insignificant, which indicates that the DGTW characteristicadjustment does a good job of capturing most of the unexplained variation in daily returns. 22 We exclude month fixed effects in these regressions because the model cannot be estimated with a post-Reg FD dummy and month fixed effects jointly (as they are collinear). 23 Note that Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) do not find a large impact of Reg FD on the return premium that mutual fund managers earn on their school-connected stocks relative to their nonconnected stocks. This could be due to a different mechanism at work in the case of mutual fund managers. It could also be due to the fact that equity analysts were under intense scrutiny during this time period, not only as a result of Reg FD, but also due to alleged conflicts of interest that led to several new policy measures being enacted by the SEC, NASD, and NYSE, and which culminated in the Global Settlement of 2003.
Another way to quantify the value of the social networks we isolate in this paper to the analyst is to test the extent to which school ties predict the probability of that analyst's becoming an All-Star. As in our prior tests, All-Star status is defined as being listed as an "All-Star" in the October issue of
Institutional Investor magazine in a given year. All-Star status is a sought-after designation among analysts, and is typically associated with higher-compensation (Stickel (1992)).
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To assess the predictive power of an analyst's network, we regress a dummy variable for All-Star status in a given year on the average number of school ties per analyst per year (Num Conn) plus a host of control variables at the analyst-and stock-level. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst was voted as an All-Star analyst for that year.
We employ a similar set of control variables as in Table VI, Table VII reports the coefficient estimates from these predictive regressions.
Columns 1-5 are OLS panel regressions, while Column 6 is a probit regression where coefficient estimates are the marginal effects on the probability of being an All-Star. Columns 1-3 indicate that the number of school ties (to senior officers, to members of the board, or to either) are a strong positive predictor of the likelihood of being an All-Star. The coefficient on connections in Column 3 implies that a 2 standard deviation move in connectedness through school ties more than doubles the probability of being an All Star, from 9.2% to 20.1%. Columns 4 and 5
24 Stickel (1992) shows that All-Star analysts also produce more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts, suggesting a link between reputation and performance. Interestingly, in unreported tests we find that the All-Star analysts in our sample do not outperform other analysts on their buy/sell recommendations; this result is consistent with prior evidence (see Groysberg et al. (2008) , footnote 27) that finds no relation between All-Star status and stock returns, except at very short windows surrounding recommendation changes. We also construct an out-of-sample test of the impact of Reg FD by replicating our results in the United Kingdom, where there was no such regulation enacted at this time. Again we form buy-sell portfolios of linked and non-linked recommendations, but we now restrict our analysis to UK-listed stocks for which we have analyst recommendations on I/B/E/S and available educational background information on both the analyst and the senior officers of the firm.
26 Table VIII shows that over the entire sample period, we again find a large schooltie return premium on buy recommendations for UK-listed stocks: a long-short portfolio that purchases linked buy recommendations and shorts non-linked buy recommendations earns 187 basis points per month (t=2.79) in raw returns, and 167 basis points per month (t=2.20) in abnormal returns. Again we find no significant school-tie premium on sell recommendations. However, unlike in the US, we see no significant difference in the school-tie premium on buy recommendations between the pre-and post-Reg FD time periods. 27 The point 25 Again we do not include year fixed effects in these specifications, because the model cannot be estimated with year fixed effects and the post Reg FD dummy variable included together. We do include analyst fixed effects in Columns 5 and 6. 26 Analogous to our US sample, we collect educational data on I/B/E/S analysts issuing recommendations on stocks traded in the UK, as defined by the I/B/E/S country exchange code. We hand matched firms from the Boardex sample to I/B/E/S using company names. Daily returns (in local currency) are from Factset. Market equity and book equity are from Compustat Global.
Note that the coverage of our sample is sparse for non-US data: By requiring educational information on I/B/E/S analysts covering UK stocks, we limit our sample to an average of approximately 30 analysts, 77 stocks, and 175 recommendations per year over the 1993-2006 time period. 27 For brevity we only report results for links to senior management, and for raw returns (in Panel estimates of the school-tie premium are actually slightly higher (although not significantly) in the post Reg FD time period. This gives confirming evidence that the Reg FD effect we find in the main (US) sample is in fact driven completely by this new regulation against selective disclosure. In the absence of regulatory change, school ties continue to confer significant benefits to analysts.
In order to better understand the type of information being transferred across the networks, we also examine the relative forecast accuracy of analysts with school ties, under the hypothesis that the information advantage gained by linked analysts is specifically related to information that would allow an analyst to better predict earnings per share numbers reported by firms. In unreported results, we find no significant differences in relative forecast accuracy (or relative forecast optimism) between the forecasts of analysts with school ties and those without.
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These results suggest that the school-tie return premium we document in Section III is unlikely to relate to information obtained about future earnings per share numbers. In unreported tests we also look at the propensity of buys among school tied and non tied firms that later announce a merger, as well as merger-relatednews return decompositions, and find little difference, suggesting that the passing of merger-related information is unlikely to fully explain our findings.
V. Robustness
In this section we perform a variety of robustness checks. First we compute event-time cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for our various categories of stock recommendations. Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns. Table IX reports event-time CARs for upgrades and downgrades only, broken down by school ties and time period. These event-time results, which we B). Results are very similar for the full set of specifications used earlier. 28 Following Malloy (2005) and Clement (1999) and using 1-and 2-year ahead earnings forecasts drawn from the I/B/E/S Detail File, we run Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of demeaned absolute forecast error (DAFE), proportional mean absolute forecast error (PMAFE), and relative optimism (OPT) on a variety of analyst characteristics plus a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst is linked to the board of directors or a senior officer of the firm being covered.
Although the sign on the dummy variables in the DAFE and PMAFE regressions is consistently negative (indicating that linked analysts are more accurate), the coefficients are generally insignificant. These results are available on request.
also plot in Figures 2 to 4 are consistent with the findings from our calendar time portfolio tests. Over the full sample period, upgrades by analysts with school ties earn a premium of 35 basis points over other upgrades in the 2 days around the event, and a premium of almost 400 basis points over the calendar year after the recommendation change. In the pre-Reg FD period, this premium increases to over 700 basis points over the calendar year after the change. Figures 2 and 3 show that much of the upgrade return premium associated with school ties is concentrated between 60 and 250 days after the recommendation, suggesting that whatever information these linked analysts obtain does not get revealed into prices until several months after the recommendation change. 
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate information dissemination in security markets.
We use the recommendations of sell-side equity analysts as a laboratory to study the impact of social networks on agents' ability to gather superior information about firms. In particular, we test the hypothesis that analysts' school ties to senior corporate officers impart comparative information advantages in the production of analyst research. Our main result is that equity analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to that company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations of analysts with school ties and going short the buy recommendations of analysts without ties earns returns of 5.40% per year in the full sample.
This result suggests that analysts' social networks facilitate the direct transfer of information, or alternatively that these networks simply allow analysts to better assess managerial quality. In order to distinguish between these two hypotheses, we exploit a regulation introduced during our sample period explicitly aimed at blocking the former mechanism of selective information transfer: , 1993-2006 This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve months, it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each recommended stock is held until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code; for the BUY portfolio, we reverse these recommendation codes so that a strong buy is set to 5 and a strong sell is set to 1. The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the exception that that the original IBES recommendation codes (i.e., strong sell=5, and strong buy=1) are used as portfolio weight. We report average returns and DGTW-adjusted returns for the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly percent. L/S is the average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. tstatistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve months it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each recommended stock is held until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code; for the BUY portfolio, we reverse these recommendation codes so that a strong buy is set to 5 and a strong sell is set to 1. The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the exception that that the original IBES recommendation codes (i.e., strong sell=5, and strong buy=1) are used as portfolio weight. We report average returns and DGTW-adjusted returns for the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly percent. L/S is average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. Pre-and Post REG FD indicates returns for recommendations issued prior and subsequent to the introduction of Regulation FD on October 23, 2000. t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve months it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each recommended stock is held until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code; for the BUY portfolio, we reverse these recommendation codes so that a strong buy is set to 5 and a strong sell is set to 1. The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the exception that that the original IBES recommendation codes (i.e., strong sell=5, and strong buy=1) are used as portfolio weight. We report average returns and DGTW-adjusted returns for the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly percent. L/S is average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. et. al (1997) . The regressions were run daily, but coefficients have been adjusted to represent monthly returns (abnormal returns) in percent. The first 3 variables are categorical variables of whether or not the analyst is connected in an education network to the given firm on which she is making a recommendation: (i) Connected to Either indicates the analyst is connected to either the senior officers or board of directors, (ii) Connected to Mgmt indicates the analyst is connected to the senior officers, and (iii) Connected to Board indicates the analyst is connected to the board of directors. Post Reg-FD is a categorical variable equal to 1 for all recommendations made after Regulation FD came into effect (Oct 23, 2000) , and 0 for all recommendations made before. Conn. Either*Post Reg-FD is the interaction term between Connected to Either and Post Reg-FD. Analyst Experience is equal to the number of years the analyst has been making recommendations recorded in I/B/E/S. Affiliation is a categorical variable that measures whether or not the given firm has an underwriting relationship with the analyst's brokerage. All Star is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the investor was voted an all star analyst in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine for the given year. Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given analyst's brokerage house.
Column 9 includes only those analysts that are in the sample both pre-and post-Reg FD. Fixed effects for month (Month), analyst (Analyst), and industry (Indus) using the Fama-French industry definitions, are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the month level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) , 1993-2006 This table shows calendar time portfolio returns (in local currency). We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting to all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve months it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each recommended stocks is hold until is either downgraded, dropped from coverage or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code, reversing the ranking from 1 (strong sell) to 5 (strong buy). The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the exception that that the original IBES recommendation code from 5 (strong sell) to 1 (strong buy) is used as portfolio weight. We report average returns and DGTW-adjusted returns in the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all I/B/E/S firms traded in the UK in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly percent. L/S is average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. Pre-and post REG FD indicates returns for recommendations issued prior and subsequent to the introduction of Regulation FD in the US on October 23, 2000. t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. , 1993-2006 This figure shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in percent. 
